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CHAPTER 15 
State and Local Taxation 
EDWARD L. GLAZER AND SAMUEL B. BRUSKIN* 
§15.1. Introduction. Although little significant legislation in the 
field of state and local taxation was produced during the 1974 Survey 
year, there were a number of interesting decisions from the Supreme 
Judicial Court and the Appellate Tax Board. This chapter will discuss 
the more important judicial and administrative decisions and the 
more important legislation within the areas of sales and use taxes, 1 
real and personal property taxes, 2 personal income taxes, 3 and corpo-
rate excise taxes. 4 
A. SALES AND uSE TAXES 
§15.2. Lease constituting a sale. In Zayre Leasing Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court, reversing and remand-
ing a decision of the Appellate Tax Board,2 held that certain leases of 
goods constituted sales and were thus exempt from the imposition of 
a sales tax under the provisions of a temporary sales tax statute. 3 
Zayre Leasing was engaged in the business of leasing furniture, fix-
tures and other equipment to Zayre department stores. It had entered 
into eighteen lease agreements with the stores, all prior to 1966. All 
leases were in the same form, differing only as to length of term, 
name of lessee, property leased, and rental covenants. Rent was ex-
pressed in each lease as a flat yearly amount which was payable in ad-
vance in equal monthly installments. All leases were said to be non-
terminable, with certain exceptions not here relevant. 
*EDWARD L. GLAZER AND SAMUEL B. BRUSKIN are associates in the law firm of Good-
win, Procter & Hoar, Boston. 
§15.1. 1 See§§ 15.2-.8 infra. 
2 See§§ 15.9-.13 infra. 
3 See§§ 15.14-.17 infra. 
4 See§§ 15.18-.23 infra. 
§15.2. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823,311 N.E.2d 888. 
2 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. '200-382, at 10,284 (1973). 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 829, 311 N.E.2d at 892. 
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The Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation assessed sales tax 
deficiencies against Zayre Leasing for the monthly rents paid under 
the leases during the thirteen months from April 1966 through April 
1967. Zayre paid the tax but sought an abatement on the ground that 
the applicable taxing statute did not cover these leases. The Appellate 
Tax Board found against Zayre, which then appealed to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 4 
The question before the Court was whether "leases" constitute 
"sales" for the purposes of certain sections of the temporary sales tax 
law declared in force on March 2, 1966. That law, section 3 of chap-
ter 14 of the Acts of 1966, provided in part that: 
Agreements for the sale of goods subject to the tax imposed by 
section one of this act and the storage, use or other consumption 
in this commonwealth of tangible personal property subject to an 
excise imposed by section two of this act entered into before the 
effective date of this section shall be exempt from the tax imposed 
by said section; provided, that such agreements are in writing, 
signed by the vendor and purchaser, and impose an unconditional 
liability on the part of the purchaser to buy the goods covered 
thereby at a fixed price without escalator clause, and an uncondi-
tional liability on the part of the vendor to deliver a definite quan-
tity of such goods at the contract price; and provided, further, 
that delivery is made not later than June thirtieth, nineteen 
hundred and sixty-six.5 
Section 79 of chapter 14 of the Acts of 1966 provided that this section 
was applicable to all "sales at retail of tangible personal property" dur-
ing the period commencing April 1, 1966, and ending December 31, 
1967. Furthermore, the statute enacting the permanent sales tax in 
19676 made it clear that the temporary sales tax statute was to apply 
for the period specified therein. 7 
The parties stipulated that each of the eighteen leases was in writ-
ing, was signed by the vendor (lessor) and purchaser (lessee), imposed 
an unconditional liability on the purchaser (lessee) to lease the goods 
covered thereby at a fixed price without an escalator clause, imposed 
an unconditional liability on the vendor (lessor) to deliver a quantity 
of such goods at the contract price, and that delivery of such goods 
was made prior to 1966.8 Thus, the sole question was whether these 
leases constituted sales so as to fall within the exemptive provisions of 
the temporary sales tax statute. 
4 Id. at 823-24, 311 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
5 Acts of 1966, c. 14, § 3. 
6 Acts of 1967, c. 757, inserting G.L. c. 64H. 
7 Acts of 1967, c. 757, § 4. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 823-24, 3ll N.E.2d at 889-90. 
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The State Tax Commission argued that exemptive provisiOns 
should be strictly construed, citing its own Emergency Regulation No. 
3, promulgated on April 28, 1966, which attempted to draw a line be-
tween true sales on the one hand and leases as assimilated sales on the 
other: 
"2. Each period for which a rental is paid shall be considered a 
complete sale for the purpose of the imposition, collection and 
payment of the sales or use tax .... 4. The sales or use tax shall 
apply to all charges for the rental or lease of tangible personal 
property with respect to periods beginning on and after April 1, 
1966, for which a rental is paid, even though the rental agree-
ment or contract was entered into prior to April 1, 1966 and 
transfer of possession to the lessee was made prior to that date."9 
The Court pointed to the definition of the term "sale" in the tem-
porary sales tax law, which included "[a]ny transfer of title or posses-
sion, or both, exchange, barter, lease, rental, conditional or otherwise, 
of tangible personal property for a consideration, in any manner or 
by any means whatsoever."10 This definition applied to the entire 
temporary sales tax legislation "except where the context clearly indi-
cates a different meaning."11 Faced with a conflict between a tempor-
ary statute and the State Tax Commission's Emergency Regulation, 
the Court held that the Regulation must fail, at least on the present 
facts, because of its inconsistency with the statute. 12 Citing a number 
of non-Massachusetts cases on comparable and related questions of 
law, the Court reversed the Appellate Tax Board, holding that Zayre's 
"leases" did constitute "sales" for the purpose of the statutes in ques-
tion and that the leases were exempt from sales tax. 13 
On its face, Zayre might appear to be a relatively inconsequential 
decision without much significance for future tax years since it in-
volves a temporary statute covering only a period from 1966 to 1967. 
However, as will be discussed below, the decision is an important one 
when placed in the context of the payment or collection of a sales tax 
in the extensive business of leasing and renting motor vehicles. 
Generally, chapter 64H of the General Laws, the sales tax statute, 
requires vendors to pay sales taxes imposed on the retail sale of goods 
and to collect reimbursements of these taxes from the purchasers of 
such goods. The sales tax upon the sale of motor vehicles, however, is 
governed by different rules. Section 3(c) of chapter 64H requires that 
any tax due on the sale of motor vehicles be paid by the purchaser to 
9 Id. at 827, 311 N.E.2d at 891 (footnote omitted). 
10 Acts of 1966, c. 14, § 1(l)(12)(a) (emphasis added). 
11 Acts of 1966, c. 14, § 1(l). 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 827-28, 311 N.E.2d at 891-92. 
13 Id. at 827-29, 3ll N.E.2d at 891-92. 
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the Registrar of Motor Vehicles and specifically prohibits the vendor 
from collecting the tax from the purchaser: 
The excise imposed by [G.L. c. 64H, § 2] upon sales at retail of 
motor vehicles or trailers shall be paid by the purchaser to the reg-
istrar of motor vehicles in the manner prescribed by the commis-
sioner. The vendor thereof shall not add the tax to the sales price 
and shall not collect the tax from the purchaser. The vendor 
thereof shall, however, furnish to the purchaser, the registrar and 
the commissioner a sworn statement of the sale upon a form pre-
scribed by the commissioner, with the approval of the commission, 
giving such information as the commissioner may require for the 
determination of such tax. 14 
Based on the Zayre decision and the definition of "sale" presently in 
section 1(13) of chapter 64H, it appears that lessors of motor vehicles 
in Massachusetts, including but not limited to automobile rental agen-
cies, in fact are prohibited by law from collecting a sales tax from the 
parties to whom they lease or rent motor vehicles. Rather, the lessee 
of the vehicles is the party with the responsibility for paying a sales 
tax "in the manner prescribed by the commissioner." Yet, no proce-
dure appears to have been prescribed by the Commissioner to date 
for the collection of sales tax from the lessees of motor vehicles. In 
fact, the State Tax Commission has on at least one occasion taken the 
position that, the language of the relevant statutes notwithstanding, 
the lessors of motor vehicles are liable for payment or collection of the 
requisite sales tax. 
In light of the Supreme Judicial Court's clear pronouncement in 
Zayre, it is submitted that no further sales tax should be assessed or 
collected from the lessors of motor vehicles, at least until such time as 
the legislature specifically indicates that section 3(c) of chapter 64H is 
not applicable to the leasing of motor vehicles. Rather, the Commis-
sioner should take immediate action to devise a system whereby sales 
tax can be collected simply and efficiently from the lessees of motor 
vehicles, as is required by the statute. Any continued attempt to collect 
sales taxes from the lessors of motor vehicles will run afoul of not 
only the prohibitions of the Massachusetts statutes, but also the recent 
pronouncement of the highest court of the Commonwealth in Zayre. 
§15.3. Sales for resale: Interstate sales. In Clark Franklin Press 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission,! the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a 
decision of the Appellate Tax Board2 which held that the sale of cer-
tain printed travel brochures was subject to the Massachusetts sales 
14 G.L. c. 64H, § 3(c). 
§15.3. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 307 N.E.2d 566. 
2 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. , 200-376, at 10,266 (1973). 
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tax.3 Clark Franklin was a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the 
printing and lithograph business. During 1969 and 1970 it printed 
and sold travel brochures to its then parent company, American In-
ternational Travel Service, Inc. (AITS), also a Massachusetts corpora-
tion. AITS was in the business of arranging group travel tours for 
various organizations, at least ninety per cent of which were located 
outside of Massachusetts. AITS' services included arranging and 
coordinating airplane landing rights, hotel accommodations, meals, 
guided tours, car rentals, and other related matters, as well as provid-
ing the organizations with travel brochures printed by Clark Franklin. 
No separate charge was made for these travel brochures, but their 
cost to AITS was included in the ultimate selling price of the entire 
package of services. For part of the period in question, Clark Frank-
lin, at the request of AITS, mailed the travel brochures directly to the 
organizations with which AITS was doing business. For the remaining 
part of the period Clark Franklin delivered the travel brochures di-
rectly to AITS in Massachusetts. AITS attached mailing labels to the 
cartons of travel brochures without opening the cartons of brochures, 
and then shipped the cartons to the various organizations. AITS at all 
times in question was listed as the purchaser of the travel brochures 
on Clark Franklin's invoices.4 
Clark Franklin argued (1) that its sales to AITS were sales for resale 
in AITS' regular course of business and thus were exempt from being 
taxed under section 2 of chapter 64H of the General Laws because 
they did not constitute "sales at retail" as defined in section 1(13) of 
chapter 64H;5 and (2) that even if the sales were sales at retail, they 
were nonetheless exempt from sales tax either as "[s]ales which the 
commonwealth is prohibited from taxing under the constitution or 
laws of the United States,''6 or as "[s]ales of tangible personal property 
in transit or stored at points of entry intended for export or import 
or which the vendor is obligated under the terms of any agreement to 
deliver to a purchaser outside the commonwealth or to an interstate 
carrier for delivery to a purchaser outside the commonwealth,''7 based 
on sections 6(a) and 6(b) of chapter 64H respectively. 
The Court rejected these contentions. It regarded it as "simplistic" 
to say that AITS resold the travel brochures to its customers, since 
AITS was in the business of selling travel services, not travel 
brochures. According to the Court: 
The transfer of brochures constituted only an insignificant part of 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 144, 307 N.E.2d at 570, aff'g Clark Franklin Press Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. '200-376, at 10,266. 
• 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 140-41, 307 N.E.2d at 567-68. 
5 Id. at 141-42, 307 N.E.2d at 568. 
6 G.L. c. 64H, § 6(a), quoted in 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 142-43, 307 N.E.2d at 569. 
7 G.L. c. 64H, § 6(b), quoted in 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 143, 307 N.E.2d at 569. 
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AITS's transactions with its customers, and it is obvious that the 
services provided by AITS were the predominant factor in the 
charges made to its customers. The fact that no separate charge 
was listed for the brochures underscores this point. These 
brochures, provided by AITS to its customers for promotional 
and advertising purposes, in and of themselves had no consumer 
value. 8 
Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim for exemption under sec-
tion 6(a) of chapter 64H since it found that the sales transactions were 
entirely between Clark Franklin and AITS, both Massachusetts corpo-
rations (with places of business within Massachusetts), and thus they 
were in all respects intrastate sales. 9 Finally, the Court found section 
6(b) of chapter 64H to be inapplicable not only because it failed to see 
any agency relationship between AITS and its out-of-state customers 
such that delivery could be said to be to AITS' out-of-state customers, 
but also because it thought that the legislature must have intended 
section 6(b) to apply only when the "direct purchaser", i.e., AITS, the 
party to the primary sales agreement, was located outside 
Massachusetts. 1 0 
The decision in Clark Franklin appears correct and predictable. 
What is somewhat surprising, however, is the State Tax Commission's 
apparent interpretation of the scope of the Clark Franklin decision. If 
an out-of-state individual orders an item from a mail order catalog of 
a Massachusetts department store, there should be no question that 
this sale will be exempt from Massachusetts sales tax under sections 
6(a) and 6(b) of chapter 64H, and that this result is entirely unaf-
fected by Clark Franklin. However, if an out-of-state individual orders 
an item from a mail order catalog of a Massachusetts department 
store but requests that the store deliver it to another out-of-state indi-
vidual, the State Tax Commission's position appears to be much less 
clear. The Commission apparently has taken a firm position in at least 
one case that if an out-of-state individual or business orders a "large" 
number of items from a Massachusetts company and requests that 
these items be mailed to various out-of-state individuals whose names 
and addresses are submitted with the purchaser's order, that these 
sales are in fact subject to a Massachusetts sales tax. It is not clear 
what constitutes a "large" number of items, though it has been sug-
gested that one hundred items is enough. 
It appears that the State Tax Commission considers the additional 
mailing services provided by a Massachusetts seller to be enough to 
turn an otherwise exempt sale into a taxable Massachusetts sale, al-
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 142, 307 N.E.2d at 568-69. 
9 ld. 
10 Id. at 143-44, 307 N.E.2d at 569-70. 
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most as if the original purchasers were constructively pulled into Mas-
sachusetts to accept delivery of the items as agents for the out-of-state 
individuals who were to be the ultimate recipients of the items, thus 
presumably bringing the sale within the scope of Clark Franklin. Why 
the additional mailing services should cause sales to become "Mas-
sachusetts sales," especially in cases where a "large" number of orders 
is placed, is far from clear. To the extent that Clark Franklin is inter-
preted to permit imposition of a sales tax in such a situation, where 
the direct mail order purchaser is not a Massachusetts individual or 
corporation, it is submitted that the State Tax Commission is severely 
distorting the Court's decision in Clark Franklin. Furthermore, such an 
interpretation directly contradicts the language of sections 6(a) and 
6(b). 
It is submitted that Clark Franklin should be construed strictly and 
be limited to cases with similar facts, i.e., where the direct purchaser is 
a Massachusetts individual or corporation. Any broadening of the 
Clark Franklin rationale ought to be undertaken with extreme caution 
in light of the seemingly wide latitude of the exemptive provisions of 
sections 6(a) and 6(b). Furthermore, it should be noted that too nar-
row an interpretation of these sections could raise serious federal con-
stitutional questions. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the state have a sufficient interest in the 
sale before it is constitutionally permitted to tax the sale.U This in-
terest is usually measured by the degree of business contacts with the 
taxing jurisdiction maintained by the parties to the sale. The exemp-
tive provisions of the Massachusetts statute appear to be a legislative 
attempt to incorporate these limitations into state law. 
§ 15.4. Filing of sales or use tax return: Amusement games prizes 
subject to use tax. In Prince v. State Tax Commission, 1 taxpayers, who 
owned and operated an amusement concession at Lincoln Park, 
claimed that the prizes awarded to successful contestants were subject 
only to a sales tax2 based on the amount charged for playing the 
game (ten to twenty-five cents). The State Tax Commission, however, 
contended that taxpayers should be assessed a use tax3 "based on the 
storage, use or other consumption of the items awarded as prizes 
•••• "
4 The Commission assessed substantial use taxes, plus interest 
and penalties, against the taxpayers.5 The Appellate Tax Board ruled 
11 See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
§15.4. 1 Appellate Tax Board, Sept. 28, 1973, digested in 2 CCH State Tax Rep., 
Mass. 11200-385, at 10,295, aff'd, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2267, 319 N.E.2d 723. 
2 G.L. c. 64H, § 21. 
3 G.L. c. 641, § 22. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2268, 319 N.E.2d at 724. 
5 Id. 
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in favor of the Commission, holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction 
of the matter since the taxpayers had failed to allege and prove com-
pliance with either the sales or use tax statutes by filing a return at or 
before the filing of their application for abatement. 6 
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Survey year, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed the Board's ruling, but bypassed the jurisdictional 
question and decided the case on the merits since it was probable that 
it presented "an issue which will recur in the future .... "7 The Court 
held that the prizes awarded were only inducements to play taxpayers' 
games and not sales at retail, and that the prizes were "clearly 'used' 
or 'consumed' in the course of operating the amusements" and were 
thus subject to the use tax. 8 
§15.5. Definitions of "sales price" and "gross receipts." In T J. 
Walsh Co. v. State Tax Commission/ the Appellate Tax Board held that 
a company engaged in the business of making fabricated cabinets, 
counter tops, and other products from lumber which it sold to indi-
viduals and contractors had to pay sales tax on the full sales price of 
the finished product paid by the purchaser of the finished product, 
based on the definitions of "gross receipts" and "sales price" in chap-
ter 64H of the General Laws.2 The company unsuccessfully argued 
that it should pay sales tax on the basis of only fifty per cent of the 
sales price, since the other fifty per cent of the sales price resulted 
from the increased value of the lumber created through its labor. Ac-
cording to the Board, it did not matter that the company's practice 
stemmed from the alleged advice of an employee of the State Tax 
Commission since, based on O'Brien v. State Tax Commission3 and sec-
tion 3 of chap_ter 14 of the General Laws, the employee did not have 
authority to bind the Commission. 4 
§ 15.6. Use tax on ships. In Boston Tow Boat Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 1 a use tax2 was upheld as validly imposed on a tug boat 
purchased from an out-of-state builder by a tow company for use in 
Boston harbor. Even though this boat would have been exempt from 
8 I d. at 2269, 319 N .E.2d at 724. 
7 Id. at 2270, 319 N.E.2d at 725. 
8 Id. at 2273, 319 N.E.2d at 726. 
§15.5. 1 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. , 200-394, at 10,310 (1974). 
2 Id. at 10,310. "Gross receipts" is defined as "the total sales price received by ven-
dors as a consideration for retail sales." G.L. c. 64H, § 1(6). "Sales price" is defmed as 
"the total amount paid by a purchaser to a vendor as consideration for a retail sale, val-
ued in money or otherwise." G.L. c. 64H, § 1(14). 
3 339 Mass. 56, 70, 158 N.E.2d 146, 156 (1959). 
4 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. , 200-394, at 10,310. 
§15.6. 1 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. , 200-395, at 10,311 (1974), rev'd, 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2275, 319 N.E.2d 908. 
2 The tax was imposed under G.L. c. 641, § I. 
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sales tax under section 6(o) of chapter 64H if purchased from a Mas-
sachusetts ship builder, the Appellate Tax Board held that the imposi-
tion of a use tax on this out-of-state purchase neither discriminated 
against interstate commerce nor violated the Due Process or Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.3 The Mas-
sachusetts sales tax exemption for ships built in Massachusetts had a 
very definite and limited purpose, i.e., to keep Massachusetts ship 
builders competitive with out-of-state builders. (Several other states 
(including Louisiana, where this particular boat was built) have sales 
tax exemptions similar to section 6(o) for ships built in the home 
state.) The Board found that no such purpose would be served by ex-
empting the tow company here involved from a use tax. 4 
Subsequent to the end of the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed the Board.5 Basing its decision on the United States 
Supreme Court case of Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 6 the 
Court held that the imposition of the use tax unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against interstate commerce by imposing a greater tax on 
vessels manufactured outside the Commonwealth than on those man-
ufactured within it. 7 
§15.7. Sales and use tax: Liability of national bank 
contractor. The Appellate Tax Board held in Salem Glass Co. v. State 
Tax Commission1 that a contractor involved in the construction of an 
office building for a national bank during a prior period when na-
tional banks were exempt from sales and use taxes under federal law2 
was subject to use taxes on items purchased in performing the con-
tract. The Board determined that the legal incidence of the tax falls 
on the contractor for his use or consumption of tangible personal 
property, and that the national bank's exemption did not extend to 
the contractor. Of particular interest in the decision is the Board's ex-
tended discussion about "the fiction of national banks as governmen-
tal agencies resulting in their exemption from non-discriminatory 
state taxation. "3 
§ 15.8. Sales and use tax: Construction of federal reserve 
bank. In Federal Reserve Bank of Boston v. Commissioner if Corporations 
3 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. at 10,314. 
4 Id. at 10,313. 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2275, 319 N.E.2d 908. 
6 373 u.s. 64 (1963). 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2282, 319 N.E.2d at 912. 
§15.7. 1 Appellate Tax Board, March 28, 1974, digested in 2 CCH State Tax Rep., 
Mass. 'I 200-396, at 10,315. 
2 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1970). See Massachusetts Emergency Sales and Use Tax Reg. No. 
12 and Amended Emergency Reg. No.6. 
3 Appellate Tax Board, March 28, 1974, digested in 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 
'200-398, at 10,315. 
9
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& Taxation, 1 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reversing a 
decision of the federal District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts,2 held that a federal reserve bank challenging the im-
position of a sales and use tax on materials and supplies used in con-
structing a new bank building may seek a federal court declaratory 
judgment on the legality of such tax. 3 The Tax Injunction Act4 was 
found to be inapplicable because the reserve bank was a federal 
instrumentality.5 Moreover, the action was held to be properlr in fed-
eral rather than state court because the question involved was largely 
a federal question, i.e., the state's power to tax federal reserve banks. 6 
B. REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES 
§15.9. Disproportionate assessments. Of primary importance in 
this area during the Survey year were two decisions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court dealing with the issue of disproportionate property 
assessments. 1 These issues were originally raised almost fifteen years 
ago in the seminal decision of Bettigole v. Assessors if Springfield2 and 
were most recently considered, subsequent to the close of the Survey 
year, in the December 1974 Supreme Judicial Court decision in Town 
of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation. 3 
In Bettigole, owners of various classes of real estate in Springfield al-
leged that the Springfield board of assessors had been assessing dif-
ferent classes of real estate in that city at widely differing percentages 
of the full fair cash value of such real estate, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Constitution and statutes of the Commonwealth require that 
all property be assessed on the basis of full fair cash value. 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth empowers the General 
Court "to impose and levy, proportional and reasonable assessments, 
rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and 
estates lying, within the said commonwealth .... "4 Furthermore, Arti-
cle X of the Declaration of Rights provides that since "[e]ach indi-
§ 15.8. 1 499 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1974), digested in 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 
f 200-404, at 10,324 (1974). 
2 368 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1973). 
3 499 F.2d at 62-64. 
4 28 U .S.C. § 1341 (1970). 
5 499 F.2d at 62 n.5. 
6 Id. at 64. 
§15.9. 1 Board of Assessors v. Zayre Corp., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1491, 304 N.E.2d 
183; Board of Assessors v. Shop-Lease Co., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 107, 307 N.E.2d 
310. 
2 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961). 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2405,321 N.E.2d 641. 
4 Mass. Const. pt. II, c. 1, § 1, art. IV (emphasis added). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/18
§ 15.9 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 327 
vidual ... has a right to be protected ... in the enjoyment of his life, 
liberty and property, ... [he] is obliged, consequently, to contribute 
his share to the expense of this protection .... "5 Section 52 of chap-
ter 59 of the General Laws requires that assessors sign, at the end of 
the annual valuation list and under penalties of perjury, a statement 
"that the real and personal estate contained in said list, and assessed 
up<>n each person in said list, is a full and accurate assessment upon 
all the property of each person, liable to taxation, at its full and fair 
cash value, according to our best knowledge and belief."6 
Based on the statutory law, constitutional requirements, and earlier 
cases/ the Supreme Judicial Court in Bettigole held that the deliberate 
practice of the assessors of Springfield of classifying all the properties 
located therein and fixing the assessed valuations of the properties in 
each classification on the basis of a percentage of full fair cash value 
which varied considerably from the percentages assigned to other 
classifications was illegal and void. 8 The practical effect of such dis-
proportionate assessment was to tax certain properties at a higher ef-
fective rate than similar properties in other classifications. 
In allowing the intervention of a court of equity, the Court distin-
guished earlier disproportionate assessment cases on the ground that 
it had found " 'a widespread scheme of intentional discrimination 
rather than merely isolated, inadvertent lack of uniformity.' "9 
Prior to Bettigole, the Court had dismissed a taxpayer's suit in Stone 
v. Springfield10 in 1960 because the taxpayer's declaration failed to 
make specific allegations of such asserted facts as would, if 
proved, establish invalid official action, as, for example, the pre-
cise nature of the lack of uniformity in assessments which he ex-
pects to prove and the circumstances indicating that it was inten-
tionally discriminatory, rather than caused by inadvertence, mis-
take, or incompetence.U 
Likewise, in the cases subsequent to Bettigole, taxpayers have had great 
5 Mass. Const. pt. I, art. X (emphasis added). 
6 G.L. c. 59, § 52 (emphasis added). 
7 Stone v. Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 168 N.E.2d 76 (1960); Carr v. Assessors of 
Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 157 N.E.2d 880 (1959); Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 
769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955). 
8 343 Mass. at 232, 178 N.E.2d at 15. For example, in Springfield in 1961 some 
22,005 single family residence parcels making up approximately 43% of the total fair 
cash value of all taxable property were paying only approximately 33% of the assessed 
taxes, whereas some 2,521 public utility, commercial and industrial parcels making up 
only 28% of the total fair cash value of all taxable property were paying as much as ap-
proximately 37% of the assessed taxes. 343 Mass. at 226-28, 178 N.E.2d at 12-13. 
9 343 Mass. at 234, 178 N.E.2d at 17, quoting Stone v. Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 
251, 168 N.E.2d 76, 79 (1960). 
10 341 Mass. 246, 168 N.E.2d 76 (1960). 
11 Id. at 249, 168 N.E.2d at 78. 
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difficulty proving the kind of "intentional discrimination" or "deliber-
ate and substantial violation" that would support such an extraordi-
nary remedy as declaratory or injunctive relief in equity, as opposed 
to the mere seeking of a single administrative abatement. 12 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted 
in two cases with significant and troublesome questions regarding as-
sessors' violations of chapter 59, section 38 of the General Laws13 and 
the implications of Bettigole. In Board of Assessors of Lynn v. Zayre 
Corp., 14 the board of assessors of Lynn appealed a decision of the Ap-
pellate Tax Board granting Zayre a partial abatement of real estate 
taxes for five successive years. Zayre alleged that "the real estate in 
question 'was deliberately and intentionally overvalued, overassessed 
and disproportionately assessed by the . . . [assessors] in relation to 
other taxable real estate ... in the city of Lynn,' and that it 'was asses-
sed in excess of its fair cash value.' "15 The Board found that the fair 
cash value of the property for each of the five years was $176,000. 
Since the assessors had assessed it at $151,000 for each year, the 
Board found for the assessors on the issue of overvaluation. However, 
the Board also found that in Lynn for the years 1967 through 1971 
the ratio of assessment to fair cash value was 30%. Thus, Zayre's real 
estate tax should have been computed on the basis of an assessed 
value of $52,800. Accordingly, the Board ordered abatements.16 
The board of assessors of Lynn appealed certain issues to the Su-
preme Judicial Court, alleging numerous grounds on which they be-
lieved the Board had made errors of law. The Court refused to con-
sider these questions on procedural grounds, holding that the asses-
sors were deemed to have waived their right of appeal on the issues 
which they were attempting to raise because neither party had re-
quested the Board to make findings of fact and a report on these 
issues. 17 
It should be noted that the Court never mentioned in its opinion, 
even as an aside or in a footnote, that the practice of the assessors in 
the city of Lynn of assessing property at a ratio of 30% of fair cash 
value, even if proportionate and across the board, violated at the very 
12 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of Somerville, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 943, 298 N.E.2d 
811; Leto v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 144, 202 N.E.2d 922 (1964). Cf. Shoppers' 
World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E.2d 811 (1965). 
13 G.L. c. 59, § 38 requires that "[t]he assessors of each city and town shall at the time 
appointed therefor make a fair cash valuation of all the estate, real and personal, sub-
ject to taxation therein .... " 
14 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1491,304 N.E.2d 183. 
10 ld. at 1492, 304 N.E.2d at 183, quoting petitioner's brief to the Appellate Tax 
Board. 
16 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1492-93, 304 N.E.2d at 183-84. 
17 ld. at 1495, 304 N.E.2d at 185, citing G.L. c. 58A, § 13, as amended by Acts of 
1969, c. 692. 
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least the clear language of chapter 59, section 52 of the General 
Laws, 18 which requires assessment at full and fair cash value. To that 
extent the Zayre case is at odds with the clear implications of the 
Court's prior decision in Bettigole and its progeny. Perhaps the Court's 
silence on this point in Zayre can be attributed to its understandable 
desire to dispose of the case on as narrow a ground as possible, i.e., 
that since the assessors had waived their right of appeal there was no 
reason to discuss the substantive matters of the case any further. 
However, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Board of As-
sessors of Lynn v. Shop-Lease Co., 19 involving the same question of an as-
sessment practice at less than full fair cash value, is more disturbing. 
Here, the board of assessors of Lynn appealed a decision of the Ap-
pellate Tax Board which granted abatement of real estate taxes to 
Shop-Lease for the years 1970 and 1971. The parties stipulated be-
fore the Board " 'that for purposes of this hearing only substantially 
all properties assessed by the Board of Assessors of the City of Lynn 
during the years ... 1970 and 1971 were, as a matter of policy, asses-
sed at 30 percent of the fair cash value of such properties.' "20 
The premises involved had been leased by Shop-Lease to various 
tenants for office and retail uses. In calculating the amount of real es-
tate tax, the board of assessors used a capitalization of net earnings 
approach to arrive at fair cash value. Even though all parties had 
agreed that the assessed value of property should be 30% of fair cash 
value and even though the Appellate Tax Board agreed to the as-
sessment on the basis of 30% of fair cash value computed on a 
capitalization of net earnings approach, the Appellate Tax Board in 
its formula for capitalizing net earnings used a factor for local real es-
tate taxes based on full fair cash value and not on 30% thereof. 21 
18 See text at note 6 supra. 
19 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 107,307 N.E.2d 310. 
20 Id., 307 N.E.2d at 311. 
21 In order to more fully understand the mechanics of the Appellate Tax Board's 
computations and the Court's findings of errors in those computations, it is worth quot-
ing at some length from the Court's decision: 
The premises were assessed for $216,700 in 1970 and $702,000 in 1971. The 
Lynn tax rate in 1970 was $200 for each thousand dollars of valuation and in 1971 
was $207 for each thousand dollars of valuation. 
The [Appellate Tax Board] determined that the net income from the premises 
before any allowance for depreciation, return on investment and local real estate 
taxes was $154,450. The board used "a 10% factor for return on investment and 
depreciation." Based on the $200 1970 tax rate (disregarding, as do we in further 
discussion in this opinion, the slightly higher rate in 1971 ), the board "allowed a 
tax factor of 20%." Although the board acknowledged the assessors' argument that 
the factor should be six per cent (30% of 20%), the board rejected that argument 
without explanation. The board then arrived at a fair cash value in both years of 
$514,800 by dividing the net income ($154,450) before any allowance for deprecia-
tion, return on investment or taxes, by the combined factor for depreciation, re-
turn on investment and taxes (.1 0 + .20 = .30). This fair cash value was reduced 
13
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The sole question arising on appeal was whether the Appellate Tax 
Board had committed an error of law in using a tax factor based on 
full fair cash value and not on 30% thereof in its formula for capitali-
zation of earnings. The Supreme Judicial Court made the point 
strongly that in the Commonwealth: 
Assessors have a constitutional and statutory duty to tax prop-
erty at its full and fair cash value. Bettigole v. Assessors if Springfield, 
343 Mass. 223, 230-232 (1961). G.L. c. 59, §§ 38, 52. See Leto v. 
Assessors if Wilmington, 348 Mass. 144, 146 (1964); Shoppers' World, 
Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 372 (1965). The ef-
fective tax rate should, therefore, always be the actual tax rate. 
Clearly, the apparent general practice in Lynn in 1970 and 1971 
to assess substantially all property at thirty per cent of its fair cash 
value was improper under the law of the Commonwealth. 22 
Notwithstanding the impropriety of what they found the assessors had 
done, the Court granted the assessors' request for reversal and re-
manded the case, stating that the Appellate Tax Board had commit-
ted an error of law when it failed to reflect the actual tax (based on 
3.0% of fair cash value) which would be payable as a result of its deci-
siOn. 
The Court, however, tried to soften its decision when it stated: "We 
wish to make it clear nevertheless that a board of assessors which has 
flagrantly failed to comply with its constitutional and statutory duty to 
assess all property at its full and fair cash value may expect to receive 
an unsympathetic reception in this court."23 Moreover, the Court 
noted that on remand the Appellate Tax Board might find the facts 
to be even more favorable to taxpayer Shop-Lease than it had found 
earlier. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the impact of the Court's de-
cision is strongly and inappropriately in favor of the assessors. 
by the board, "(u]sing the 30% ratio agreed to by both parties," producing an as-
sessed value of $154,440. Abatements were accordingly granted. 
The board's decision in effect provides an allowance for local real estate taxes of 
$102,960 (20% of the fair cash value found by it [$154,800]). However, on the 
basis of the assessed value established by the board's decision ($154,440) the actual 
1970 local real estate tax to be paid is only $30,888 (20% of $154,440). Thus that 
portion of the net income available for depreciation, return on investment and 
taxes which will be available for other than taxes will be approximately $123,500, 
rather than $51,480 (10% of the fair cash value found by the board). Such a re-
turn would support a higher fair cash value of the property than that found by 
the board. 
Id. at 108-09, 307 N.E.2d at 312. The Court assumed that the "failure of the board to 
arrive at $154,450 (instead of $154,440) after first dividing, then multiplying, $154,450 
by .3 ... was a typographical error or was caused by roundings." Id. at 109 n.2, 307 
N.E.2d at 312 n.2. 
22 Id. at 109, 307 N.E.2d at 312. 
23 Id. at 110, 307 N.E.2d at 312. 
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Only Justice Reardon in dissent seemed to understand the full im-
pact of the majority's decision, including the majority's tacit approval 
of the assessors' violations of such statutes as (1) section 38 of chapter 
59 by assessing at other than full fair cash value, (2) section 52 of 
chapter 59 by falsely certifying to the correctness of their valuation 
lists, and (3) section 29 of chapter 41 by swearing to accurate 
valuations. 24 Justice Reardon stated: 
Notwithstanding its criticism of the assessment practices, in its de-
cision the court effectively ratifies the lawless conduct of the asses-
sors and even rewards it by requiring the board to make that il-
legality part of its valuation calculations . . . . The party seeking 
relief from this court is not a taxpayer suffering under an illegal 
system but rather the assessors who are the authors of the illegal-
ity. Adding insult to injury, the assessors insist that the board 
should have fully assimilated this illegal method of assessment into 
its valuation. In these circumstances the assessors have no good 
cause to bemoan any unjust treatment. 
. . . The assessors in effect are asking this court to take a 
thoroughly illegal system and to adjudicate proportionality within 
its unlawful context. To do so is to pervert the functions of the 
court. The result is also prejudicial to the efforts of those asses-
sors in cities and towns of the Commonwealth where an effort is 
made to comply with the law. See, e.g., G.L. c. 58, §§ 9-10C, 
18C .... 
If the assessors are truly concerned with equity among the tax-
payers of Lynn, they have a simple remedy at hand: that is to 
obey the law. I would not give them the relief they have sought. 25 
In December 1974, subsequent to the conclusion of the Survey year, 
the Court decided Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corporations & 
Taxation, 26 which will likely have a far-reaching effect on the taxation 
of all property, both real and personal, in the Commonwealth. 
The Town of Sudbury and certain of its officials filed a bill in 
equity in the county court for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation and the State Tax 
Commission, claiming that the Commissioner had failed to enforce 
the constitutional and statutory duty of assessors to tax property at its 
full fair cash value. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court re-
ferred the case to a master and thereafter confirmed the master's re-
port and reported the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court without 
decision. 27 
24 ld. at 112, 307 N.E.2d at 314 (dissenting opinion). 
25 Id. at 113-15, 307 N.E.2d at 314-15 (dissenting opinion). 
26 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2405,321 N.E.2d 641. 
27 Id. at 2406, 321 N.E.2d at 644. 
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The master had found that prior to Bettigole most real estate in the 
Commonwealth had been assessed at figures well below full fair cash 
value. Since 1966 more than one-half of the 351 cities and towns in 
the Commonwealth had gone through a revaluation process. The 
other cities and towns continued to assess at ratios well below full fair 
cash value and to assess different classifications of real property at 
different percentages of their value. Furthermore, revaluations, when 
done, had usually been done only once, and such revaluations were 
often out-of-date even before they were put into effect.28 
In every even-numbered year the Commission established equalized 
valuations of taxable property for each city and town. The master 
found that for 1972 the assessment ratios, i.e., the ratios of local asses-
sed value to estimated full fair market value, ranged from 19% to 
100%. Those cities and towns which had revalued their property 
tended to come much closer to full fair cash value than those cities 
and towns which had not revalued. Sudbury was one of the towns 
which was found to have assessed its property at or near its full fair 
cash value.29 
Although the 1974 equalized valuations were found to be improved 
in quality, the master found that there was no assurance that the 1974 
equalized valuations approximated full fair cash value since equalized 
valuations are largely based on the ratio of assessments to sales for 
each of four classifications of real estate, i.e., commercial, industrial, 
residential and vacant land. These ratios were found by the master to 
be lacking in precision in several respects. First, sales data failed to 
supply enough information to insure that only arm's length sales were 
used. Second, frequency of sales varied with the types of property. 
Third, appraisers were expected to come up with appraisals in far less 
time than was required. The master cited a number of other varied 
reasons. 30 
Nonetheless, equalized valuations established by the Commission 
were found to be of substantial importance to each of the cities and 
towns within the Commonwealth since they play an important role in 
determining amounts to be distributed to each city and town as school 
aid, highway funds and lottery funds, and in apportioning the burden 
of county and other taxes. On the whole, the master found that those 
cities and towns which had revalued received far less in the way of 
state funds than they would have received if they had not revalued.31 
Perhaps the most important part of the master's extensive findings 
was the conclusion that illegal assessments have been the rule and not 
the exception within a large part of the Commonwealth. As the Court 
28 Id. at 2407, 321 N.E.2d at 644. 
29 Id. at 2408, 321 N.E.2d at 644. 
30 Id. at 2410-12, 321 N.E.2d at 645. 
31 Id. at 2409-10, 321 N.E.2d at 644-45. 
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noted: "We have no doubt that many assessors have taken the oath 
and subscribed the statutory statement in the belief, or even on the 
advice of counsel, that it was to be understood in an Aesopian or 
Pickwickian sense."32 
The Commissioner is conferred by statute with full power of direc-
tion over the actions of assessors in the various cities and towns in the 
Commonwealth.33 Furthermore, he has a statutory duty to prosecute 
assessors for any violations of their duties,34 as well as to direct them 
to adopt methods which will insure the proper execution of their 
duties. 35 Nevertheless, the master's findings showed that although the 
Commission has attempted to establish equalized valuations at fair 
cash value, as required of it by statute, it has not been able to achieve 
acceptable uniformity or equalized valuations within an acceptable 
range of full fair cash value. 36 The Commission's task of equalization 
is made even more difficult by the fact that assessors in various cities 
and towns engage in fractional valuation. The end result is that those 
cities and towns whose assessors act lawfully are discriminated against 
in favor of those cities and towns whose assessors illegally value on a 
fraction of full fair cash value. 
One example from the Court's opinion will illustrate the "fairyland" 
within which assessors have often been valuing property in the Com-
monwealth: 
The work sheets for Boston, for instance, show a composite 
assessment/sales ratio of 38%. But the 1973 median ratios for sales 
of residential property in different districts in the city ranged 
from 16% for Charlestown to 40% for Roxbury, with a composite 
residential ratio of 27.8%. Thus from data including the facts that 
the median sale in Charlestown brought about six times the asses-
sed value and the median sale in Roxbury brought about two and 
one-half times the assessed value, computation produces the con-
clusion that residential assessed values throughout the city should 
be equalized at a little less than four times assessed value. The 
process has lost contact with reality. If, as often happens, property 
with a low rate of turnover is assessed lower than property with a 
high rate of turnover, the result is a serious understatement of 
equalized value. 37 
Based on the master's findings, the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
plaintiffs declaratory relief. The Court found that an actual con-
32 Id. at 2413, 321 N.E.2d at 646. 
33 G.L. c. 58, § I. 
34 ld. 
35 Id. § 4. 
36 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2418-19, 321 N.E.2d at 647. 
37 Id. at 2420, 321 N.E.2d at 648. 
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troversy had arisen with regard to the powers and duties of defen-
dants with respect to taxation of property at full fair cash value. 38 
Further, plaintiffs had shown a probable loss of revenue which was 
sufficient to give them a significant economic interest in the con-
troversy. Therefore, a declaratory decree was found appropriate. 39 
The Court refused, however, to grant plaintiffs injunctive relief.40 
Citing earlier cases, the Court noted that it had traditionally refused 
injunctive relief unless ( 1) clear proof was shown of deliberate and 
substantial violation of the constitutional and statutory requirements 
of proportional property tax valuations; (2) plaintiffs could show 
themselves to be adversely affected both directly and significantly; (3) 
relief by normal abatement procedures or by an action at law would 
be seriously inadequate; or (4) equitable relief is shown to be particu-
larly practicable and appropriateY Without passing on the question 
of whether plaintiffs had shown that these conditions for injunctive 
relief were present, the Court chose to reserve injunctive relief for the 
present time on the ground that the master had in effect found that 
"the commissioner and the commission stand ready to do their duties 
if they are told what they are, and what their powers are to carry out 
their duties."42 
Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the county court, and 
entered the following interlocutory decree: 
(1) the commissioner has the power and the duty to direct local 
assessors to take such action as will tend to produce uniformity 
throughout the Commonwealth in valuation and assessments; (2) 
the commission has the power and the duty to direct city and 
town officers to furnish such returns and statements relative to 
the amount and value of taxable property in the city or town as it 
deems necessary to enable it to determine and establish for each 
city and town an equalized valuation which shall be the fair cash 
value of all property in such city or town subject to local taxation 
as of January 1 in each even-numbered year; and (3) the func-
tions of the commissioner and the commission in these respects 
are to command and not merely to advise or educate, and it is the 
legal duty of the assessors to obey their lawful commands. The 
decree is further to provide that jurisdiction of the case is re-
tained pending further order of a single justice, that the commis-
sioner and the commission are to make a report of progress to the 
single justice within six months after the entry of the interlocutory 
38 Id. at 2423, 321 N.E.2d at 649. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2422, 321 N.E.2q at 648. 
41 Id. at 2421-22, 321 N.E.2d at 648. 
42 Id. at 2422, 321 N.E.2d at 648. 
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decree, and that the single justice will thereafter make such inter-
locutory or final decree as is appropriate.43 
It is still far too early to assess the impact which the Court's decision 
in Town rif Sudbury will have on taxation of property throughout the 
Commonwealth. Perhaps the only point on which all seem to agree is 
that this decision will likely revolutionize property tax practices 
throughout the Commonwealth. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the Court's decision calls into question not only the taxation of all 
real property in all the cities and towns of the Commonwealth, but 
also the taxation of all personal property therein. 
§15.10. Methods of valuation of a nursing home. In Schlaiker v. 
Board of Assessors rif Great Barrington, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board upholding the refusal 
of the board of assessors of Great Barrington to grant an abatement 
of real estate taxes on a nursing home. The Court held that the 
Board correctly found that the nursing home owners had not carried 
their burden of proving that the property had been overassessed 
through the assessors' use of the "reproduction costs less deprecia-
tion" method of valuation rather than the "capitalization of income" 
method used by the owners. 2 The Board had found no credible or 
persuasive evidence that taxpayers' property had a lower value than 
that assessed, and the decision of the Board was held to be final as to 
findings of fact. 3 Since the burden of proof was on the taxpayers to 
make out their right as a matter of law to abatement of a tax, it was 
proper for the Board to presume that the valuation made by the as-
sessors was valid unless taxpayers sustained the burden of proving the 
contrary, which they failed to do. 
§l5.ll. Valuation of property whose value decreased subsequent 
to January I. Sarris v. Board rif Assessors of Swampscott 1 was a relatively 
straightforward case, albeit one in which considerable sympathy must 
be felt for the taxpayer. Taxpayer had filed a petition with the Appel-
late Tax Board challenging the denial by the board of assessors of 
Swampscott of his application for abatement of 1970 real estate taxes. 
Taxpayer's home had been damaged by fire on January 14, 1970, and 
he argued that this fact should be taken into account in the assessors' 
valuation as of the past January 1. The Appellate Tax Board and the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court both recognized that the applicable 
statute2 speaks in terms of an assessment as of January first, that taxes 
43 Id. at 2424-25, 321 N.E.2d at 649. 
§15.10. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 689,310 N.E.2d 602. 
2 Id. at 691-92, 310 N.E.2d at 604-05. 
3 Id. at 691, 310 N.E.2d at 604, citing G.L. c. 58A, § 13. 
§15.11. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 577, 315 N.E.2d 892. 
2 G.L. c. 59, § 11. 
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on real estate are assessed annually, and that they are not assessed for 
any period of time but rather as of a fixed date. Thus, the Board and 
the court found that even though as a result of the fire there was a 
temporary diminution in value of taxpayer's property following the 
assessment date, there was no justification for abatement from the full 
fair cash value established by the assessors on January 1, notwith-
standing any seeming equities to the contrary. 3 
§15.12. Business corporation v. manufacturing corporation. In 
Stewart In-Fra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. State Tax 
Commission, 1 the Appellate Tax Board held that a food distributor that 
produced meat and cheese sandwiches through a variety of 
mechanized processes constituted a "domestic manufacturing corpora-
tion" under section 2 of chapter 58 and section 38C of chapter 63 of 
the General Laws. Accordingly, it was exempt from local property tax 
on its machinery and was subject to tax thereon at the state level 
under the tangible property component of the corporate excise tax. 
The Board's opinion is valuable in that it contains a good discussion 
of some of the distinctions between so-called "business" and "man-
ufacturing" corporations. Machinery used by a domestic business cor-
poration (as defined in section 30 of chapter 63) is subject to the local 
ad valorem property tax. 2 Machinery used by a domestic manufactur-
ing corporation (as defined in section 38C of chapter 63) is specifically 
exempted from the local property tax. 3 
§15.13. Legislation. A considerable volume of legislation was 
passed in the area of real and personal property taxes during the past 
year. One of the more important pieces of legislation was chapter 287 
of the Acts of 1974, which added new clause 41A to section 5 of chap-
ter 59 of the General Laws, to permit certain persons 65 years of age 
or over to postpone payment of all or a portion of their real estate 
taxes under specified circumstances. In order to qualify for this de-
ferral, an individual must enter into tax deferral and recovery agree-
ments with his board of assessors. Upon the individual's death his 
heirs must make up the taxes plus eight per cent interest. If his heirs 
fail to pay the tax and interest, the amounts are payable from the 
individual's estate. 
A second important piece of legislation was chapter 1118 of the 
Acts of 1973, which added chapter 61A to the General Laws. The 
purpose of chapter 61 A is to provide for the assessment of agricul-
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 577-78,315 N.E.2d at 892-93. 
§15.12. 1 Appellate Tax Board, April I, 1974, digested in 2 CCH State Tax Rep., 
Mass. '200-397, at 10,315. 
2 G.L. c. 59, § 5(2). 
3 Id. § 5(3). 
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tural and horticulturalland1 at a value based upon the agricultural or 
horticultural use of the land in a manner permitted by Article XCIX 
of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of Massachusetts, 
which was adopted by the voters on November 7, 1972. This statutory 
provision sets up procedures whereby the eligibility (and loss of eligi-
bility) of land for valuation, assessment, and taxation on this lower 
basis can be determined. The provisions of this statute shall apply to 
fiscal years ending June 30, 1975 and thereafter. 
C. PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 
§15.14. Income from real property located outside of 
Massachusetts. Prior to the amendment of chapter 62 of the Gen-
eral Laws by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, it was clear that the in-
come tax imposed by chapter 62 was an income tax of the property, 
not excise, tax variety. As such, the chapter 62 income tax had been 
held not to subject to taxation income received by a Massachusetts res-
ident from real estate located outside Massachusetts. 1 Ingraham v. 
State Tax Commission, 2 a case of first impression, raised the issue of 
whether chapter 555 changed the basic nature of chapter 62 to an in-
come tax of the excise variety, such that Massachusetts could properly 
tax income received by a resident from non-Massachusetts real estate. 
The Appellate Tax Board held in the affirmative for the State Tax 
Commission. 
The facts in Ingraham were relatively straightforward. Appellant was 
a resident of Massachusetts who received income in 1971 in the 
amount of $4,530.22 from the sale of standing timber located on land 
in Maine and $81.10 as rental income and receipts from the sale of 
gravel from land also located in Maine. Appellant initially included 
these items in income on his return for the year 1971, which return 
was filed April 14, 1972. On the same date he also filed an application 
for abatement of that portion of the tax paid attributable to the inclu-
sion of these items of income from the Maine real estate. This appli-
cation for abatement was denied. 3 
The Appellate Tax Board's holding was based on three significant 
conclusions of law. First, Article XLIV of the Amendments to the 
Constitution of Massachusetts did not prohibit the imposition of an 
income tax of the excise type. Second, Article XLIV did not limit the 
§15.13. 1 As defined in G.L. c. 61A, §§ I, 2. 
§15.14. 1 State Tax Comm'n v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969); State Tax 
Comm'n v. Wheatland, 343 Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d 340 (1962); Riesman v. Commis-
sioner of Corps. & Taxation, 326 Mass. 574, 95 N.E.2d 656 (1950). 
2 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass.' 200-400, at 10,317 (1974). 
3 Id. at 10,317. 
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application of the income tax law to the classes of income originally 
taxed by chapter 62. Third, the legislature, in amending section 2(a) 
of chapter 62 in 1971 so as to define gross income as federal gross in-
come with certain modifications, intended to change the statute to an 
income tax of the excise type: 4 
It seems to the board that since the Federal Income Tax is itself 
an excise, the adoption of the Federal concept of gross income is 
a strong indication of legislative intent to change the underlying 
philosophy of Chapter 62 from a classified income tax of the 
property tax type to a general income tax of the excise type.5 
The Ingraham decision was predictable based on prior case law. In 
1950 in Riesman v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 6 the Su-
preme Judicial Court definitively held that an income tax of the 
property tax variety could not be laid on income from realty located 
outsid,e of the boundaries of Massachusetts: 
The income tax being a property tax, the Commonwealth cannot 
assess such a tax upon real estate for whose benefit and advantage 
it has not afforded and cannot afford security and protection. It 
cannot lay what has uniformly been classified by this court as a 
property tax upon realty located outside the boundaries of the 
Commonwealth. 7 
In 1962 in State Tax Commission v. Wheatland, 8 which involved a fac-
tual situation much like that in Ingraham, the Court found no legisla-
tive intent under the then existing statute to impose a tax upon rental 
income9 derived either within or outside Massachusetts. 10 Based on 
the doctrine of strict construction of tax statutes, and in order to 
avoid constitutional doubts, the Court held that the Massachusetts stat-
ute "should be construed as not taxing the proceeds of the sale of 
timber located in Maine." 11 Thus, Wheatland can be viewed as a retreat 
from Riesman in the sense that it was decided on the basis of statutory 
interpretation and not on a constitutional basis. In Ingraham the 
Board distinguished Wheatland on the ground that section 3 of chap-
ter 555 of the Acts of 1971 clearly subjected to taxation rental income 
derived from real estate in Massachusetts, 
The most recent in this line of cases, State Tax Commission v. Fine, 12 
4 Id. at 10,317-19. 
5 Id. at 10,318. 
6 326 Mass. 574, 95 N.E.2d 656 (1950). 
7 Id. at 577, 95 N.E.2d at 659. 
8 343 Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d 340 (1962). 
9 The privilege of severing from the land a substantial part of its value was deter-
mined to be analogous to rent payments. 
10 343 Mass. at 653, 180 N.E.2d at 342. 
II Id. 
12 356 Mass. 51, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969). 
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involved the taxation of dividends paid by a foreign trust to a Mas-
sachusetts holder of its transferable shares. The dividends were the 
result of "royalties" received by the trust from a lessee for the 
privilege of taking iron ore and other minerals from Minnesota land 
owned by the trust. Relying on cases such as Wheatland, the Court 
held that such income was not subject to tax in Massachusetts. 13 The 
Court went on to say that it would have been a different case if the 
legislature had expressly intended to tax such income: 
We assume, without deciding, that within art. 44 of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth a statute might 
be devised (a) which clearly was not intended to have the effect of 
a property tax upon the land outside Massachusetts from which 
was derived the income sought to be taxed and (b) which would 
bring the Massachusetts income tax ... within the scope of the 
decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States ... as deal-
ing with income taxes of the excise type.14 
The Board in Ingraham decided the question assumed in Fine and de-
termined that through chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, the legislature 
had devised such a statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Board 
cited affirmatively the 1971 Annual Suroey of Massachusetts Law, in 
which while discussing the scope of the 1971 legislative amendments, 
it was stated: 
The new statute should end once and for all the dispute between 
the court and the legislature over whether or not the personal in-
come tax is a property tax. Short of an express legislative declara-
tion that the new law is to be construed as a true income tax, the 
legislature has done as much as possible to enact a tax having all 
the characteristics of an income tax. 15 
The Ingraham decision has been appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
§15.15. Acquisition of Massachusetts domicile upon mar-
riage. In Green v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court considered the question of whether a New 
Hampshire woman becomes domiciled in Massachusetts for tax pur-
poses upon marriage to a Massachusetts resident, even though she did 
not move to Massachusetts until about five months later. The case 
arose in the context of a bill for declaratory judgment brought by the 
plaintiff taxpayers. Justice Braucher, speaking for the Court, rejected 
13 Id. at 59-60, 247 N.E.2d at 707. 
14 Id. at 59, 247 N.E.2d at 707. 
15 Shaw, State and Local Taxation, 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 3.7, at 39. 
§15.15. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1549, 305 N.E.2d 92. 
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the Commissioner's contention that the established common law rule 
" 'that a wife's domicile, absent some marital wrong committed by her 
husband, follows that of her husband' "2 should govern for tax pur-
poses. The Court discussed how this common law doctrine had been 
eroded in other contexts in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions, and 
refused to extend what it calls the "vanishing fiction of identity of 
person" into the field of taxation. 3 The Court held that Lea Green 
was not domiciled in Massachusetts until she moved to Massachusetts 
and thus the capital gain she recognized prior to that move was not 
subject to Massachusetts tax. 4 It should be noted that this holding was 
based not on constitutional interpretation, but rather on an interpre-
tation of the Massachusetts taxing statutes. However, language in the 
decision should be helpful to persons attempting to make a constitu-
tional argument in other contexts. 5 
§15.16. Taxation of interest and dividends from savings 
deposits. Chapter 77 of the Acts of 1974, which inserts a new sec-
tion 2(b)(l)(A) of chapter 62 of the General Laws, clarifies to some 
degree the taxation of interest and dividends on term and time de-
posits in specified banks located in Massachusetts. It is now clear that 
savings deposits in such banks include term and time deposits having 
a principal amount of less than $100,000. Interest and dividends on 
deposits in such banks are taxable at the 5% rate rather than the 9% 
rate. The taxation of interest and dividends on term and time de-
posits having a principal amount of more than $100,000 is still un-
clear, but there is a strong negative inference in this statutory provi-
sion that such income is subject to tax at the 9% rate. 
Unfortunately, a number of questions remain unanswered. For ex-
ample, if a taxpayer has a $150,000 term deposit, is all or only 1/3 of 
the interest on such term deposit subject to the higher 9% rate? Can 
the taxpayer transform all of the interest into 5% income merely by 
purchasing two $75,000 term deposits rather than one $150,000 term 
deposit? Also, no statutory guidance is provided as to how "term and 
time deposits" are defined. 
This provision applies to taxable years commencing after December 
31, 1972. 
§15.17. Employment related expenses. Chapter 848 of the Acts 
of 1974 amended section 3B(a) of chapter 62 of the General Laws by 
2 I d. at 1551, 30[> N .E.2d at 93, quoting Brief for Respondent. 
3 Id. at 1554, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
4 Id. at 1555, 305 N.E.2d at 95-96. 
5 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cast doubt on the 
constitutional validity ... of fictitious rules as to residence .... The commissioner 
would have us read the word "inhabitant" to include a woman ... who has just 
married an inhabitant without regard to any of the facts with respect to her habita-
tion. We are not prepared to do so. 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1554-55, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
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inserting new subparagraph (7) to provide for a deduction from Mas-
sachusetts adjusted gross income of child care expenses incurred to 
enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed. The deduction is to be 
computed as provided in section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code. 1 
Such expenses must have been paid during the tax year that is being 
reported. 
This provision is applicable to tax years commencing after De-
cember 31, 1974, and no expenses incurred prior to January I, 1975 
shall be claimed under this provision, regardless of when paid. 
D. CoRPORATE ExcisE TAXES 
§15.18. Security corporations. In Industrial Finance Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 1 the Appellate Tax Board held that a corporation en-
gaged in the business of lending money and whose loans were evi-
denced by promissory notes was not entitled to the special corporate 
excise tax treatment afforded to "security corporations."2 The tax-
payer was in the business of loaning money. The loans were evi-
denced by promissory notes and typically were secured by real estate 
mortgages, personal property mortgages, or both. Loans ranged from 
about $2,000 to over $1,000,000, and were made to a variety of bor-
rowers for personal and business uses, including construction loans. 3 
The case involved the years 1963 through 1967. Taxpayer applied to 
the Commissioner for classification as a domestic security corporation 
under the provisions of section 38B of chapter 63 of the General 
Laws, but the request was denied. 4 
A security corporation is defined in section 38B as a domestic busi-
ness corporation or foreign corporation which is engaged exclusively in 
buying, selling, dealing in or holding securities on its own behalf and 
not as a broker, and which either makes application to the Commis-
sioner to be classified as a security corporation and is so classified, or 
has been so classified for a prior year and such classification has not 
§ 15.17. I 26 u .S.C. § 214 (1970). 
§15.18. 1 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 1f200-389, at 10,300 (1974). 
2 G.L. c. 63, § 38B. 
3 The taxpayer actually described itself as a "Business Credit Agency" which engaged 
in "Secondary Financing." By "Secondary Financing," the taxpayer meant that it did not 
engage in permanent financing such as first mortgages. The financing rendered was 
for a relatively short period, until the borrower could arrange permanent financing 
such as construction loans. It should be noted that the Board makes little of this point, 
which might provide one way of limiting the scope of this decision. 
4 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass.1f 200-389, at 10,300. Mass. Excise Ruling 1967-1 sets 
out the information required to be submitted to obtain "security corporation" classifica-
tion. 
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been revoked. 5 Any security,corporation which is not a regulated in-
vestment or bank holding company under present law is subject to an 
excise tax equal to the greater of 1.2% of its gross income for the tax-
able year6 or $114. A security corporation is not subject to the normal 
excise tax imposed by sections 32 or 39 of chapter 63. 7 
The Commissioner has taken the position that in order to qualify as 
a security corporation a corporation cannot be engaged in business ac-
tivities other than those enumerated in section 38B during any part of 
its taxable year. In 1972 the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with this 
position in Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Commission. 8 Chatham involved a 
corporation which had been engaged in a manufacturing operation 
only for the first seven days of its taxable year, after which time the 
operating assets were sold in a bulk sale which had been negotiated 
prior to the beginning of the taxable year. The Court held that the 
corporation did not qualify for the favorable tax treatment provided 
by section 38B. 9 
The basis of the Board's holding in Industrial Finance is far from 
clear. The Board spent considerable effort defining regulated invest-
ment companies (and investment companies) and concluded that tax-
payer did not qualify as a regulated investment company (or an in-
vestment company) because taxpayer: (1) was not an issuer; (2) did 
not have shareholders who had been induced to purchase its securities 
by the prospect of obtaining diversification and expert management 
of their investments; and (3) did not hold itself out as being engaged 
primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in 
securities. 10 The definition of a security corporation surely must be 
broader than that of an "investment company," as so defined; other-
wise, a holding company would be excluded from classification as a 
"security corporation." 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Board finally reached the cru-
cial issue: whether the promissory notes which represented the loans 
made by taxpayer constituted "securities" for purposes of section 38B. 
The Board indicated that there were many definitions of "security" 
and that the federal Investment Company Act of 194011 included 
5 G.L. c. 63, § 38B was amended in 1966, effective for 1967, and again in 1971 and 
1973. These amendments did not affect the question at issue in this case. The 1966 
amendments in effect created two categories of security corporations: those which were 
regulated investment or bank holding companies under the Internal Revenue Code and 
those which were not. The major difference between these two categories of security 
corporations is the excise tax rate imposed on them. 
6 As defined in G.L. c. 63, § 30. 
7 G.L. c. 63, § 38B(c). 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1297, 285 N.E.2d 420. 
9 Id. at 1299, 285 N.E.2d at 422. 
10 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 11 200-389, at 10,302-03 (1974). 
11 15 U.S.C. § BOa (1970). 
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promissory notes within its definition of the term. However, the 
Board then fell back on the definition of investment company in the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which excluded any person whose 
business was that of making small loans, etc. The Board also pointed 
to the fact that under Massachusetts real estate law, the taxpayer was 
acquiring title to interests in real estate where its loans were secured 
by real estate mortgages. 12 
It is submitted that judicial and/or legislative clarification of what 
constitutes a "security" for purposes of section 38B is required. 13 Lit-
tle guidance is provided by the Appellate Tax Board's opinion in 
Industrial Finance. It is hoped that on appeal the Supreme Judicial 
Court will produce a fuller analysis of the issue here involved. 
§15.19. Credit for certain corporations which increase their 
number of full-time employees. Chapter 791 of the Acts of 1973 
adds section 31 C to chapter 63 of the General Laws to provide a tax 
credit to a manufacturing corporation or to a business corporation 
engaged primarily in research and development. This tax credit is re-
lated to the increase in the number of individuals who fall within 
specified groups of full-time employees employed during the taxable 
year. The credit applies to taxable years ending on or after December 
31, 1973 and before December 31, 1978. 
The amount of the credit is determined by multiplying $500 by the 
increase in the number of certain full-time employees, namely those 
who immediately prior to employment received either: (1) public assis-
tance, (2) unemployment compensation, or (3) job training in an ap-
proved program (after December 31, 1974, the number may be in-
creased by those employees currently participating in employer sub-
sidized programs to upgrade job skills, wages and promotional pos-
sibilities). The increase in the number of full-time employees is de-
termined by the excess of (1) the number of full-time employees em-
ployed during the year over (2) the number of full-time employees 
during the corporation's year ending immediately prior to December 
31, 1973, multiplied by 1.03 for taxable years ending on or after De-
cember 31, 1973 and before December 31, 1974 (other coefficients 
are used for subsequent years). 
The credit must be elected each year in lieu of the special deduc-
12 2 CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 1J 200-389, at 10,303 (1974). 
13 At the present time, the State Tax Commission has total discretion in determining 
whether a corporation qualifies as a "security corporation." The authors understand 
that the State Tax Commission interprets the definition of "security corporation" very 
narrowly, and may even take the position that a corporation which holds exclusively 
stock (constituting control) in affiliated companies does not so qualify. It is submitted 
that such a position is incorrect since it directly contradicts the definition of a "security 
corporation" contained in G.L. c. 63, § 38B. The authors read § 38B to provide that a 
security corporation can be engaged exclusively in "holding" securities on its own be-
half. 
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tion permitted for compensation to employees domiciled in poverty 
areas. The credit is in addition to the business investment credit. 
§15.20. Disclosure of the contents of tax returns and the joint 
audit thereof. Chapter 922 of the Acts of 1973 added sections 48 
and 49 to chapter 58 of the General Laws. Section 48 provides that 
the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation may permit the Sec-
retary of the Treasury of the United States or the proper tax officer 
of any territory, state or political subdivision to inspect any return re-
quired to be filed with the Commissioner and to furnish information 
concerning any item contained in such return. Such information may 
be disclosed only if it is used exclusively for the purpose of adminis-
tering tax laws, and only if similar reciprocal privileges are granted to 
the Commissioner by the United States or such other taxing jurisdic-
tions. Section 49 provides that the Commissioner may participate 
jointly with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States or with 
the proper tax official of any territory, state, or political subdivision in 
the audit of any return required to be filed with the Commissioner. 
Also, the Commissioner may examine any tax return filed with the In-
ternal Revenue Service or any other taxing jurisdiction to the extent 
that the tax of the federal government or any other such taxing juris-
diction is similar to a tax imposed in Massachusetts. 
§15.21. Dividends from other corporations: Long-term capital 
gains and losses: Sale or exchange of intangible property. Chapter 
722 of the Acts of 1974 amends section 38 of chapter 63 of the Gen-
eral Laws in two significant respects. First, it provides that dividends 
received from other corporations are taxable unless the receiving cor-
poration owns more than 15% of the voting stock of the paying cor-
poration. Prior to this amendment such dividends were not taxable 
unless they resulted from the ownership of shares in a corporate trust 
or were deemed or actual distributions, other than of previously taxed 
income from a DISC. 1 These two exceptions to the general rule that 
dividends from another corporation are not taxable are retained. 
Second, this amendment includes in net income 100% of any long-
term capital gains realized on the sale or exchange of intangible prop-
erty. Prior to this amendment, taxpayers had been entitled to a de-
duction equal to 50% of any such gains. 
This statutory provision is applicable to taxable years ending on or 
after December 31, 1974. 
§ 15.22. Nominee trusts. Tax practitioners should be aware of a 
ruling, presently in proposed form, which the Commissioner may 
issue in the future with respect to nominee trusts. The proposed rul-
§15.21. 1 A "DISC" (Domestic International Sales Corporation) is "a corporation 
which meets the requirements of section 992(a)(1) of the Federal Internal Revenue 
Code .... " G.L. c. 63, § 30(15). 
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ing takes the position that a nominee trust is a separate entity for 
Massachusetts tax purposes unless the trustee has no powers other 
than the power to hold title and to do those things, such as execution 
of documents, which must be done by the title-holder. If a nominee 
trust is treated as a separate entity, a beneficial owner would not be 
permitted to report his share of losses from the property on his own 
Massachusetts tax return. The proposed ruling requests that trustees 
of any trust holding title to property which produces gross income in 
excess of $100 file Form 2 (Fiduciary Income Tax Return). Also, if 
the trustees believe that the trust is not subject to tax, a statement con-
taining all facts and circumstances upon which the claim is based 
should be attached to the return. 
Although the ruling is only as yet a proposal, practitioners should 
review nominee trusts which permit the trustee to act on direction of 
the beneficiaries and consider amending or eliminating such trusts. 
§ 15.23. Excise tax rate: Property measure. During the Survey 
year the State Tax Commission, pursuant to section 31 B of chapter 63 
of the General Laws, determined that the tax rate applicable to the 
property measure of the excise tax shall be reduced from $7.98 per 
$1,000 to $5.76 per $1,000 (including the 14% surtax) for taxable 
years ending December 31, 1973 and thereafter. Subsequent to the 
Survey year, the Commission further reduced the tax rate applicable 
to the property measure of the excise tax to $2.60 per $1,000 (includ-
ing the surtax) for taxable years ending December 31, 197 4 and 
thereafter. Both of these tax rate reductions are applicable to both the 
tangible and net worth measure of the excise tax for both domestic 
and foreign corporations. 
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